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the Battlefield: Utility of Multimedia
Information Transmission
Sandro Scielzo and Adams Greenwood-Ericksen, University of Central Florida,
Orlando, Florida
In the theatre of war, environmental and workload factors (e.g., noise, time pressure) may dramat-
ically overburden operator's cognitive processes. Well designed multimedia technology can suc-
cessfully minimize both intrinsic (working memory capacity) and extrinsic (inefficient use of
information) sources of cognitive load, thereby facilitating the decision-making process. These
positive mediating effects of multimedia technology can occur during three distinct phases of
human information processing: 1) during sensorial information acquisition, by filtering out unnec-
essary environmental noise and transferring information via context-dependent modalities; 2)
during decision-making, by making critical task-relevant cues more salient; and 3) following
response execution, by providing necessary feedback to effectively evaluate the appropriateness
of the decision taken. After analyzing the dramatic events that led to many US soldier casualties in
a Somali rescue mission, this paper will propose a set of recommendations to help future task
forces in urban environments, and to specify the greater goal of multimedia use on the battlefield.
Introduction
On October 3 rd 1993, 75 US Rangers, 40 Delta Force operators and a number of
Navy SEALS and Air Force Special Operations personnel staged a daylight raid into the
Bakara market in downtown Mogadishu, Somalia. Together, these forces made up a
combat unit known as Task Force Ranger, under the command of Major General Will-
iam F. Garrison. The goal of the raid was the capture of several leaders of the Habr Gidr
clan, a local Somali political organization which had been engaged in a bloody confron-
tation with UN and American forces for over a year. The United States had stepped in to
assist a failing UN humanitarian mission, but a number of poor strategic decisions on
the part of the US and the UN, coupled with a sophisticated propaganda campaign by
Habr Gidr leaders contributed to a climate in which US forces were perceived by the
general population as enemies. Eventually, US policymakers decided to mount an oper-
ation to remove the leader of the clan, Mohammad Farrah Aided, from power and try
him for crimes against humanity. It was to this end that US forces began attempting to
round up members of Aidid's inner circle and advisors. The raid in question was
expected to capture two of these individuals.
The Mission
The original plan was for four security elements from the 75th ranger regiment (also
known as "chalks") to deploy from UH-60 "Blackhawk" helicopters and establish a
security perimeter around the target building where the clan leaders were meeting.
Delta Force operators would then deploy from AH-6 "Littlebird" assault helicopters,
clear the building, and secure the hostages. A ground vehicle column waiting nearby
would approach the area and load up the prisoners and Delta operators. The ranger
security forces would then collapse back to the assembly area in front of the target
building, load up into the vehicles, and the whole force would be transported by Humvee
and truck back to base. Unfortunately, everything did not go according to plan. Sec-
onds into the raid, an 18 year-old ranger fell from a helicopter and was badly injured.
Minutes later, another helicopter was shot down by a rocket propelled grenade (RPG), a
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simple but highly effective Soviet-designed weapon.
Shortly thereafter, a second chopper was shot down in the
same manner. US efforts on the ground were immediately
redirected toward securing the crash sites and extracting
survivors. Humvee columns which had originally been
tasked to transport American soldiers and their prisoners
were reassigned to locating and protecting downed air-
crews and injured soldiers. The carefully planned opera-
tion disintegrated into chaos as units scattered in different
directions, hunting crashed helicopters or attempting to
find tenable defensive positions as thousands of armed
militiamen converged on their locations. Many units spent
the entire night pinned down under heavy fire, while con-
stant close air support missions by AH-6 "Littlebird" heli-
copters kept them from being overrun. With dawn came
additional support units with light armor support, and the
survivors were evacuated to safety.
Escalating Chaos
A number of specific errors contributed to the chaos on
the ground. There were persistent problems with commu-
nication between ground units and air scout and com-
mand units. Often information was relayed inaccurately,
too late, and in a confused manner. To make matters
worse, there was a significant time delay between the time
when the scout choppers in the air identified the route the
vehicle columns were to follow, and the time that the driv-
ers on the ground got the information. The time lag was
so bad that the vehicles repeatedly missed turns because
they didn't get the information in time. The solution pro-
posed by the command structure, that the Humvees slow
down, exposed them to heavier fire and produced more
casualties.
The evacuation column became lost and was forced to
navigate the streets with little useful guidance from the air,
taking heavy fire from buildings, rooftops, and alleys and
suffering terrible casualties as a result. Back at the com-
mand center, the operation commander, Maj. Gen. Will-
iam Garrison, could see the action from above courtesy of
relayed camera footage from the circling scout choppers
and advanced satellite imaging, but he was largely unable
to communicate that information to the troops in any use-
ful format. Ultimately, communications were the greatest
weak spot in the entire operation, and the greatest source
of confusion on the ground (Bowden, 1999).
A Costly Toll
The total human cost for US forces during the opera-
tion was 18 American special operators killed and 84
wounded. This disaster represented the single bloodiest
day in American military history since the Vietnam con-
flict. Worse, the individuals lost were members of the
most elite of American fighting units, those with the best
training and equipment, the most combat experience,
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and therefore the hardest to replace. It is estimated the
average American special operator costs upwards of a
million dollars a year to train and equip, and units com-
posed of these individuals serve a strategic role far in
excess of that suggested by their numbers. While poor
planning, questionable tactical decisions, ineffective
weaponry, and bad luck all played a role in this disaster,
the predominant causal factor for this mission's failure
was the inability of US forces to adequately manage and
disseminate information. It is imperative that US forces
learn to adequately communicate information where it is
needed most, and in the most usable format.
A Case for Multimedia
Could these tragic events have been prevented with the
kind of technology our armed forces have at disposition
considering that technological advances have changed
the way we communicate information, and presumably
for the better? This question might never be fully
answered; however, it is possible to examine with a critical
eye the extent to which information was optimally trans-
mitted. In other words, were the correct context depen-
dent modalities used when conveying information? Was
this information provided at the right time and in a way
that minimized cognitive load? One of the goals of this
paper will be to answer to these questions while providing
an optimal information transmission framework based on
multimedia principles and information processing.
Multimedia has been proposed as an optimal way of
delivering information in that it makes use of multiple
modality delivery methods such as video and audio. The
military is quick in adopting new technologies; however,
the central issues are: first, when does a multi modal
transmission of information enhance the acquisition of
information; and, second, where should multimedia be
employed to produce an environment that would facilitate
the acquisition of information. It is of paramount impor-
tance to understand how information from the environ-
ment is processed in order to deliver it in such a way that
it facilitates decision making.
What is Multimedia?
Multimedia generally refers to "using, involving, or
encompassing several media" (Mayer, 2001). Using multi-
media can provide several sources of information both
within and across modes. An example of collapsing infor-
mation within one modality is the association of visual
animations with its textual description. In this case, the
modality used is visual, and even though text and anima-
tions are differentially processed within our memory, both
sources of information are perceptually channeled
through the visual system. An example of distributing
information across modalities occurs when an audio
37
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source of information is overlaid with the content of an
animation. In this case, the audio and the animation are
respectively channeled through the visual and auditory
modality. While technological advances make it easy to
deliver several sources of information simultaneously
(e.g., visual and audio), it is important to keep in mind
what are the operator's cognitive limitations when pro-
cessing incoming multimodal information. Thus, when
modalities are combined in a proper way, they can con-
tribute to enhance both information acquisition and pro-
cessing, thereby maximizing good decision-making.
Technology versus Operator Centered Approach
This increased amount of information that can be
delivered using technological tools has led to the technol-
ogy-centered approach of multimedia learning as coined
by Mayer (2001, p.8). This approach focuses on the tech-
nology's power to convey information. However, it is nec-
essary to stress again that the technology's capability to
handle vast amount of information that is transmitted to
us may not guarantee an appropriate perception and
assimilation of the information itself. It is of paramount
importance to recognize that the resources allocated by
the brain in order to integrate perceived information are
limited and therefore competing with each other. This
idea of simultaneous tasks (Le., integrating information
across or within modalities) competing with one another
for the limited mental resources available, which may
cause performance to deteriorate, have been collectively
called resource theories (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Wick-
ens, 1987). Similarly, the notion of information compet-
ing for our limited cognitive capacity, which is in contrast
to the technology centered approach, led to the develop-
ment of a theoretical framework aiming to determine
under which conditions multimedia presentation pre-
serves mental resources from being depleted. The theo-
retical framework in question could be described as the
operator-centered approach of multimedia, similar to the
learner-centered approach described by Mayer (2001) as
"the use of multimedia technology as an aid to human
cognition" (p.lO). The focus of this approach is to estab-
lish how learning can be fostered by technology, thereby
elevating the role of technology as a cognitive aid capable
of adapting to learner's cognitive processing.
Cognitive Capacity
Early studies in experimental psychology revealed how
limited cognitive resources could be when dealing with
the acquisition of new information (Miller, 1956). More
specific on the handling of new information, the develop-
ment of Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) working memory
model more systematically demonstrated the differing
capacities of dynamic human information processing.
Essentially, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed that
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auditory and visual information is differentially processed
via two separate and distinct channels in working mem-
ory. Auditory stimuli, that is, acoustic and verbal informa-
tion (e.g., audio information), is processed through the
phonological loop, which is comprised of both a phono-
logical store and an articulatory rehearsal component.
The phonological store is a system for temporarily main-
taining speech-based input and the articulatory
rehearsal component represents a system for refreshing
this information as it decays. This latter component of the
phonological loop is also used to translate printed input
into a phonological form. Similarly, visual stimuli, that is,
information pertaining to the visual and spatial features of
a given stimulus event (e.g., animations, diagrams), is
processed through the visuospatial sketchpad. A third,
higher order component, the central executive, coordi-
nates and allocates limited attentional resources to these
two other subsystems of working memory. The take
home message from this theory is that the two working
memory subsystems, or slave systems, can be easily
overburdened. In other words, it is easier for working
memory to handle incoming information that is visual
and audio (e.g., driving a car and talking to a radio) than
incoming information that is both visual (e.g., two simul-
taneous visual tasks could be ready a map while driving a
car).
Cognitive Load
How much is too much information? The cognitive load
theory, conceptualized by Sweller (1994), examined how
the characteristics of incoming information may make
material more difficult to acquire. Sweller (1994) described
how concept integration consists of schema acquisition
and transfer of learned procedures from controlled to auto-
matic processing, both of which decrease the burden on
working memory. Furthermore, Sweller and his colleagues
(e.g., Kalyuga, Chandler, & Sweller, 1999; Marcus, Cooper,
& Sweller, 1996; Sweller, 1999; Sweller & Chandler, 1994)
differentiated between two sources of cognitive load: intrin-
sic cognitive load arising from the training's content or
extrinsic cognitive load due to training system design fac-
tors. It is important to understand how those two forms of
cognitive load operate in order to optimize the processing
of multimodal information.
Intrinsic cognitive load depends on the interactivity of
the information to be acquired and how complex that
interaction is. In other words, when there are many infor-
mation rich elements that need to be related together the
intrinsic cognitive load is high, as well as the strain on the
limited cognitive capacity. The other main source of cog-
nitive load, extrinsic cognitive load, is artificially produced
because of inadequate presentational modes, which
mainly impose split-attention and redundancy of infor-
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mation. Split-attention refers to how multiple sources of
information presented simultaneously have a negative
load on working memory. For example, conveying infor-
mation visually with both images and text will cause learn-
ers to devote one part of their attention to the animation
and another part to the text. Overall, extrinsic cognitive
load will be caused by an inadequate use of modalities
when presenting information.
In sum, the cognitive load theory suggests that not
only it is necessary to present information via the right
modalities in order to reduce extrinsic load, but the infor-
mation itself has an intrinsic component that can saturate
working memory. In case of combat, it becomes crucial to
optimize information transmission in order to minimize
potential decision-making errors.
Information Processing
When conveying information, one way to maximize the
efficiency with which information is transmitted is to capi-
talize on multimedia. However, it is necessary to under-
stand when to use multimodal information in the greater
context of information processing. Wicken's model of
human information processing (1992) provides a general
framework that isolates the different stages of informa-
tion, from the perception of stimuli to the physical
responses (see Figure 1). Understanding how information
is processed is fundamental in order to better understand
how soldiers on the battlefield handle the processing and
execution of commands.
I
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Wicken's model is important not only to under-
stand information processing but also to be aware of
the stages in which attention resources are being
depleted. A review of the main stages is necessary
before attempting to integrate a multimodal compo-
nent aimed at maximizing attention resources and
information processing.
Stages of Information Processing
Stimuli from the environment are initially processed by
our sensory receptors. The quality of the processed stim-
uli will depend on the stimulus source itself. At this stage
it only matters that according to the environment context,
any type of information in the form of a sensory stimulus
(e.g., visual, audio) can be registered in order to be effec-
tively processed. Specifically, each sensory modality is
capable of holding incoming stimuli at a pre-attentive
level, however the information decays rapidly ranging
from a few seconds to up to half a minute in case of the
auditory registry.
Perceptual encoding is the next stage of informa-
tion processing and requires the depletion of some
mental resources in order to be attended to. In this
stage long-term memory will attribute meaning to the
oncoming stimuli. This stage is also crucial since
most non salient stimuli from the environment will be
filtered away. At this point it also important to note
that other internal factors like stress can reduce atten-
tion resources, thereby impeding some information to
















Figure 1. Adaptation of Wicken:S model ofhuman infonnation processing
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The stage of decision-making comes after stimuli are
attended to. Again, attention resources are drawn from
our mental capacity in order to process the perceived
information in order to decide and select what response
to enact. Decision-making is a complex process that can
heavily draw on the limited cognitive resources we have at
our disposal when processing information. Since deci-
sion-making is directly influenced by the perceived infor-
mation and the ability to make sense of it, it because
critical to ensure that the information received is high in
quality, or at least minimize its degradation.
Following decision-making a response execution oc-
curs. In other words, after the operator has selected what
plan to enact based on the information received, that plan
will have to be executed physically. In turn, the execution
of a decision taken will become a source of feedback that
will be relayed to the sensory store under the form of envi-
ronmental stimulus. It is important to stress the utility of
feedback and the importance of perceiving it in a timely
manner to help determine the appropriateness of a deci-
sion taken.
Enhancing Information Processing
Altogether, these stages of information processing are
critical to identify what areas can be enhanced when
using multimedia.
In particular, multimedia can provide the short term
sensory store with quality stimuli according the environ-
mental context. For example, a specific type of informa-
tion that is typically conveyed via audio (e.g., two-way
radio communication) might not be appropriate in case
of an environment saturated with noise, which is not
unlikely during combat operations. In this case, the right
modality of use should be visual or even tactile in order to
transmit the same information. Furthermore, by using
some common technology, unwanted stimuli could be
automatically filtered out. On the combat field, this could
be the case of headphones that filter out unnecessary
background noises.
Another stage of information processing that can be
enhanced by the use of multimedia is decision-making.
Specifically, it is during the intermediate decisions that
eventually lead to a response that multimedia can be
most effective in helping select the appropriate informa-
tion that will serve as a basis onto which a response is
made. For example, in order to facilitate the rehearsal of
information that can lead to responses, some information
can be displayed in time until an execution is made,
thereby decreasing the cognitive load imposed by the
rehearsal process. Concretely, this could mean that a spe-
cific order to any infantry soldiers would keep feeding into
their sensory store until they perform the very order. On
another level, special displays could enhance the visual
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information received by highlighting certain important
features in the environment.
Following response execution probably comes the
most important phase within a combat situation in which
the use of the right modalities can drastically improve
information processing. This is the feedback stage. The
critical component of this stage is that feedback should
be provided in a timely manner in order to give time to
the operator to correct a specific response that has not
been properly executed.
Putting the Pieces Together
Multimedia shows great promise in addressing a num-
ber of the issues inherent in infantry combat in urban
environments. One of the most salient features of light
infantry operations is the importance of timely and effec-
tive communication. Good communication is a force mul-
tiplier which can greatly influence the outcome of a
conflict, particularly when one force greatly outnumbers
the other. This idea is hardly new; over two thousand year
ago, Sun Tzu identified "clear signals and signs" as one of
the most vital requirements for victory in battle (Sun Tzu,
trans. 2001). The point has been made repeatedly since
(Barnett, 2003, Clausewitz, trans. 1950). When communi-
cations fail or are compromised, unit coordination and
cohesion suffer drastically (C1ausewitz, trans. 1950, Hart,
1954). The use of multimedia provides a number of sig-
nificant advantages to a force in the field.
Modes of Communication
Much of the information that needs to be transmitted
in combat is simple: "we're under attack," "we're taking
casualties," "we're pinned down." These pieces of infor-
mation can be readily communicated in a number of
ways and are unlikely to provoke confusion. Much of the
information, which needs to be communicated in combat
is highly sensitive to the context and environment in
which it originates. Additionally, it is quite difficult to com-
municate the majority of complex tactical information
through traditional means. Often a clear understanding of
the transmitter's environment is necessary in order for
the receiver of information to effectively assimilate it. The
phrase, "I'm taking fire from the second floor of that large
building," only has meaning if the individual receiving the
information knows which building the speaker is referring
to. Often, in the fluid environment of battle, this additional
information is not readily available.
Moreover, the most common form of communication,
speech, is poorly suited to the task of communicating
spatial information, regardless of whether the speech
occurs in person or over some form of remote communi-
cations system. Text format is not much better in terms of
the user's ability to provide context for information, and
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has the additional drawback of preventing access to many
of the cues humans use in face to face communication,
such as tone of voice, body language, and facial expres-
sion. Video format has a significant number of advan-
tages in transmitting visual or spatial information, but is
costly, both in terms of attention (as discussed above)
and technological complexity.
The clearest communication occurs when individuals
are able to speak face to face because all modalities and
cues for communication are available. Thus, the more
modalities involved in communication, the more cues are
available; the more cues available, the clearer communi-
cation is. Therefore, simultaneous video and audio com-
munication provides the best quality of communication.
The Cost of Multimedia: Balancing Demands
However, the level of attention and processing required
by multiple modality communication means that the cog-
nitive load on the communicators will be significantly
increased, as will the demand for attentional resources.
Accordingly, while communication would be clearer, per-
formance on other tasks which need to be performed
simultaneously might suffer. The last thing that a platoon
leader needs is to try to carryon a videophone conversa-
tion with a superior officer while engaged in a Iife-or-death
firefight. Additionally, the level of technology currently
available allows for this type of interaction only at great
financial expense and technical difficulty. Worse, this rela-
tively new technology has significant reliability issues, fur-
ther reducing its current usefulness.
The need for improved communication must therefore
be weighed against the communicators' need to perform
other activities such as driving, navigating, and giving
orders and conducting tactical operations. An appropriate
application of multimedia must consider both the informa-
tion which needs to be communicated and the demands
of the communicators' environment.
While an empirical examination of these concepts is
necessary, before attempting to apply them to units in the
field, a few recommendations of appropriate applications
of multimedia to communications in the infantry combat
domain can be made based on existing literature. Some
material, such as tactical level commands, should retain
the current "voice only" format. This allows for an accept-
able level of clarity in communications while minimizing
demand on spatial mental resources and interference with
perceptual abilities needed for other tasks.
When information with high spatial or visual content
must be transmitted, the use of video or still images sup-
plemented by text or speech is recommended. For
instance, when identifying a route on a map, a visual rep-
resentation of a map, supplemented with still images of
various landmarks would provide a great deal of informa-
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tion in the clearest possible way, particularly if supple-
mented by text or speech. One example of particular
interest is the common requirement of identifying targets
for artillery or air strike. Commonly termed a "call for
fire," this type of activity is of great tactical importance
but presents great danger to friendly personnel if it is not
performed in an accurate and timely manner. Visual
imagery of the target site and the area around it, as well
as the exact location of the request for fire, both marked
on a digital map and supplemented by map grid coordi-
nates and a time stamp, both in text form, could clearly
and unambiguously communicate the information neces-
sary for a successful call for fire while reducing the
chances of a potentially disastrous error.
While some specific recommendations can be made
regarding the use of multimedia technologies, it is impor-
tant to understand that each specific application of multi-
media to combat communications must be carefully
examined and standard operating procedures developed
prior to operationalizing this technology. While multime-
dia offers remarkable benefits to an armed force in the
field, it can also cripple communications and degrade per-
formance on other vital tasks. Careful thought must be
given to specific uses of these forms of communication
and the context in which they operate before decisions
are made to incorporate them into field units.
Could Multimedia Have Helped Task Force
Ranger?
The events of October 3rd and 4th, 1993 were tragic in
their implications for the American soldiers who were
killed and maimed, their families, the military establish-
ment and America as a whole. A great number of factors
contributed to the outcome of these events; no one factor
or set of factors bore sole responsibility. Moreover, it is not
the intent of this work to analyze in depth the failings in
tactical planning or political policy that led to the final out-
come. The purpose of this section is to suggest ways in
which the appropriate use of multimedia might have
helped to protect and assist the American servicemen on
the ground during these events.
Navigation
One of the most significant factors which led to the
high casualty rate incurred by American forces was their
inability to effectively navigate the battle-scarred, chaotic
city of Mogadishu. The Humvee column which was
intended to extract the prisoners and friendly forces and
was later reassigned to locating and securing the two
crash sites was constantly missing turns throughout the
engagement because scout choppers could not provide
them with accurate and timely information on their route.
For most of the battle, scout choppers were attempting to
41
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scout routes for the convoy on the fly, giving them verbal
directions on when and where to turn. Unfortunately, spo-
ken communications were poorly suited to describing a
spatial route which had to be navigated visually, and the
Humvees were often unable to recognize important inter-
sections where turns had to be made.
Feedback
The problem was exacerbated by a clumsy relay sys-
tem which forced the scout choppers to route their infor-
mation first through one officer in charge of air
operations, then through the overall commander, then to
the officer in charge of ground operations, then to the sol-
diers on the ground, racing along in their vehicles. Often
information about turns reached them long after they had
already passed the intersection. Additionally, the informa-
tion was sometimes garbled in translation, making a bad
situation even worse. As a result, the Humvee columns
drove erratically around the combat area, circling repeat-
edly trying to locate the correct route to reach the troops
they were supposed to evacuate. Eventually, the original
column was so badly shot up that they were forced to
retreat the base to regroup and rearm before they reen-
tered the city to try once again to reach their comrades.
Had an effective form of multimedia communication been
available to the scout choppers and Humvees, they might
have been able to effectively communicate through visual
imagery and annotated maps the best route to follow. The
greater complexity of information available through a
map and image format of information transmission could
have allowed the vehicles on the ground to see multiple
turns at once, far in advance of actually arriving at them.
Such a system might have allowed them to successfully
reach the scattered units attempting to rendezvous at the
crash sites before the situation deteriorated completely.
Coordination and Communication
An additional area in which multimedia could have
assisted the men of TF Ranger is through improved coor-
dination between soldiers. Since most units were scat-
tered and lost, they were unsure of the locations of fellow
Americans, which resulted in a number of dangerous
friendly fire incidents and a general lack of coordination
among units. This significantly weakened the American
forces, who needed the advantage of superior coordina-
tion and massed firepower to overcome the vast disparity
in numbers between them and the disorganized bands of
Somali militiamen they faced. By representing the known
locations of friendly units spatially, they might have been
more able to maintain contact with other units and coor-
dinate their movements so as to concentrate against
important targets, such as enemy forces approaching the
crash sites.
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Ultimately, a great number of factors contribute to the
success or failure of military operations. The complexity
of the environment, the state and strength of enemy and
friendly forces, and the tactics and plans utilized by each
side are merely a few of the myriad factors involved in
determining the outcome of combat. Superior communi-
cations are merely one element which affects the course
of battIe, but they are indeed an important element. Multi-
media shows impressive promise as one means of dra-
matically improving communications between units in
combat, and offers significant tactical and strategic
advantages to the armed forces of the nation which
employs it.
Conclusion
The Somali example illustrates how breakdown in
communications lead to a tragic escalating effect that
turned what should have been a typical rescue mission
into chaos. Could a context dependent use of multimedia
have saved the day? This question might never be fully
answered; however, this paper isolated a number of cir-
cumstances in which using the right modalities to convey
information would have at least helped events unfold in a
more positive manner.
Applying multimedia to the battlefield is a difficult task
that has to account for several factors. First, it is neces-
sary to realize that technology should only be a vehicle to
support multimodal information transmission. In fact, it is
dependent upon our limited cognitive capacity to process
information perceived by our senses. As a result, multi-
media technology should be learner-based (Mayer,
2001) in order to maximize information processing. Sec-
ond, multimedia should be presented in such a way as to
minimize both intrinsic and extrinsic forms of cognitive
load, especially in a battlefield context which exacerbates
mental capacities. Finally, multimedia should be used to
maximize the main stages in information processing.
Only then can the use of multimedia technology be war-
ranted.
This paper pointed out specific areas that could have
helped the task force to achieve its goals. Specifically,
problems concerning the navigation of the Humvee col-
umn through the Mogadishu maze could have been
largely prevented by presenting orders in a timely manner
and utilizing multimedia technology. As a result better
coordination and communication patterns would have
emerged.
Multimedia technology still has a long way to go before
it can be efficiently integrated in urban combat in order to
maximize information transmission. However, there are
no doubts that eventually, a sound use of multimedia
technology will indeed provide task forces with a new
Volume 7 NO.2
weapon capable of being a decisive factor between life
and death.
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